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“MALICIOUS DEEPFAKES”—HOW
CALIFORNIA’S A.B. 730 TRIES (AND FAILS) TO
ADDRESS THE INTERNET’S BURGEONING
POLITICAL CRISIS
Alexandra Tashman*
I. INTRODUCTION
Alternative facts are not facts; they’re falsehoods.
—Chuck Todd, in response to Kellyanne Conway on NBC’s Meet
the Press.1
In today’s era of “fake news,” there are a myriad of ways to make
what is false seem entirely real. The proliferation of half-truths,
mistruths, and un-truths is no longer constrained to the realm of yellow
journalists and tabloids; rather, anyone from the nation’s most
powerful figures to conspiracy theorist bloggers can generate a
national controversy out of nothing. This shift has not occurred in a
vacuum. Instead, technology has been the engine driving change in
what becomes news, who creates news, and how news reaches the
public.
The central legal problem surrounding the astounding rate of
technological developments is that they constantly outpace any
regulatory attempts to constrain them.2 This is true broadly, but it
keenly applies in the context of manipulated media—commonly
* J.D. Candidate, May 2021, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A History and Political
Science, University of California, Los Angeles, September 2015. Sincere thanks to Professor
Rebecca Delfino for the inspiration and advice. Thank you as well to my dear friends Savannah
Badalich and Adam Drown for being my sounding boards, and for guiding me through the technical
aspects of writing this Note. And finally, thank you to my parents, sister, grandparents, and friends
for their unfailing and unconditional support.
1. NBC News, Kellyanne Conway: Press Secretary Sean Spicer Gave ‘Alternative Facts’ |
Meet the Press | NBC News, YOUTUBE (Jan. 22, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VSrE
EDQgFc8.
2. Julia Griffith, A Losing Game: The Law Is Struggling to Keep Up with Technology, J.
HIGH TECH. L. (Apr. 12, 2019), https://sites.suffolk.edu/jhtl/2019/04/12/a-losing-game-the-law-isstruggling-to-keep-up-with-technology.
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referred to as “deepfakes.”3 Deepfakes are “highly realistic and
difficult-to-detect digital manipulations of audio or video.”4 The word
is a portmanteau of “deep learning” and “fakes,” which together
roughly encapsulate what the technology is.5 The name can also be
traced back to a Reddit6 user, who went by the name “deepfakes,” and
was the first to widely disseminate the technology in 2017 (as a means
of spreading nonconsensual pornography).7 Part of what makes this
technology so insidious is that there is no one “type” of deepfake. The
Washington Post has attempted to sort deepfakes into three categories:
those that involve “missing context” (which includes
misrepresentation and isolation of clips), those which use “deceptive
editing” techniques (which use omissions and splicing), and videos
that have undergone “malicious transformation” (which involves
doctoring and fabricating footage).8 These videos can run the gamut
from silly (like a viral clip of actor Steve Buscemi’s head on actress
Jennifer Lawrence’s body)9 to terrifying, and can include videos
manipulated for political gain, national security threats, and revenge
pornography.10 What makes deepfakes even more disconcerting is that
it is often hard to tell—especially at first glance—whether a video is
manipulated or authentic.11 Subsequently, even the most erudite of
3. Nadine Ajaka et al., Seeing Isn’t Believing: The Fact Checker’s Guide to Manipulated
Video, WASH. POST (June 25, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/politics
/fact-checker/manipulated-video-guide [https://web.archive.org/web/20201217114615/https://w
ww.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/politics/fact-checker/manipulated-video-guide/].
4. Robert Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deepfakes and the New Disinformation War: The
Coming Age of Post-Truth Geopolitics, FOREIGN AFFS., Jan./Feb. 2019, at 147, 147–48.
5. Rebecca A. Delfino, Pornographic Deepfakes: The Case for Federal Criminalization of
Revenge Porn’s Next Tragic Act, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 890 n.5 (2019).
6. Matt Silverman, Reddit: A Beginner’s Guide, MASHABLE (June 6, 2012),
https://mashable.com/2012/06/06/reddit-for-beginners. Reddit is an internet platform designed to
allow users to share videos, images, and stories which are spread to a greater (or fewer) number of
viewers through the number of “upvotes” (positive endorsements) or “downvotes” (negative
endorsements) a post receives. Id.
7. Delfino, supra note 5, at 893; James Vincent, Why We Need a Better Definition of
‘Deepfake,’ THE VERGE (May 22, 2018, 2:53 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/5/22/173803
06/deepfake-definition-ai-manipulation-fake-news; Samantha Cole, We Are Truly Fucked:
Everyone Is Making AI-Generated Fake Porn Now, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 24, 2018, 10:13
AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/bjye8a/reddit-fake-porn-app-daisy-ridley.
8. Ajaka et al., supra note 3.
9. Delfino, supra note 5, at 897.
10. See generally Bobby Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for
Privacy, Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1753, 1776 (2019) (detailing the
dangers that deepfake technology will pose to society, using politics, national security, and revenge
pornography as examples).
11. Id. at 1758–59.
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news consumers (and perhaps more crucially, political officials) can
fall prey to what these types of videos purport to depict.
The spread of deepfakes is particularly alarming as it applies to
the democratic process. Altered videos have already begun to make a
substantial impact on the American political psyche, as the nation has
come to place its trust in video news (a quarter of modern Americans
now obtain the bulk of their news from YouTube).12 Consequently,
deepfake videos have the potential to create devastating ramifications.
Deepfake videos “could feature public officials taking bribes,
displaying racism, or engaging in adultery. Politicians and other
government officials could appear in locations where they were not,
saying or doing things that they did not.”13 The FBI has expressed
serious concern about these possibilities, noting in a March 2021
bulletin that malicious foreign actors have already begun to use
“synthetic content” in influence campaigns.14 Further, the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace even asserts that deepfakes “have
the potential to incite violence, alter election outcomes, and undermine
diplomacy.”15 These warnings are not merely hypothetical. Deepfake
videos have already become impactful in the electoral context. For
example, many of former President Donald Trump’s supporters
believed his January 7, 2021, concession video was in fact a deepfake
(it was not).16 Political manipulation via deepfake even transcends
national borders. In April 2021, Dutch politicians were tricked on a
live video call by an impersonator using deepfake technology to

12. Sarah Perez, A Quarter of US Adults Now Get News from YouTube, Pew Research Study
Finds, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 28, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2020/09/28/a-quarter-ofu-s-adults-now-get-news-from-youtube-pew-research-study-finds.
13. Chesney & Citron, supra note 10, at 1776.
14. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, MALICIOUS ACTORS ALMOST
CERTAINLY WILL LEVERAGE SYNTHETIC CONTENT FOR CYBER AND FOREIGN INFLUENCE
OPERATIONS (2021), https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2021/210310-2.pdf; see also Glenn Gow,
The Scary Truth Behind the FBI Warning: Deepfake Fraud Is Here and It’s Serious—We Are Not
Prepared, FORBES (May 2, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/glenngow/2021/05/02
/the-scary-truth-behind-the-fbi-warning-deepfake-fraud-is-here-and-its-serious-we-are-notprepared/ (“Another phrase for ‘synthetic content’ is deepfake content.”).
15. Elections: Deceptive Audio or Visual Media, Third Reading of Assembly Bill No. 730
Before the S. Rules Comm., 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. 6 (Cal. 2019) (as amended Aug. 13, 2019).
16. Daniel Villarreal, Parler Users Call Trump’s Concession Video ‘Deep Fake,’ and Worry
He’ll ‘Sell Us Out,’ NEWSWEEK (Jan. 7, 2021, 11:59 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/parlerusers-call-trumps-concession-video-deep-fake-worry-hell-sell-us-out-1559895.
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appear as Leonid Volkov, chief of staff to Russian opposition leader
Alexei Navalny.17
Managing the spread of this form of disinformation also presents
logistical and technological challenges. Video authentication
technology remains in its infancy and is not easy to do either quickly
or cheaply.18 Even as that technology develops, it is being exploited to
improve the quality of deepfakes themselves.19 With few tangible
methods available to establish veracity, these types of deepfakes will
only continue to impact the outcomes of campaigns and elections.
It is for this reason, among many others, that lawmakers have
begun actively trying to find ways to legislate the creation and
proliferation of so-called “malicious” deepfakes.20 Unsurprisingly,
they have encountered a series of obstacles. In part, this is because
many lawmakers have a limited understanding of cutting-edge
technology and are conflicted on how to regulate it effectively.21 Plus,
the regulation of media, no matter how harmful to society that media
may have the potential to be, rings alarm bells for free speech
advocates of all political persuasions.
At the forefront of this issue is California Assembly Bill No. 730
(“A.B. 730”).22 Passed by the California State Legislature in
September 2019 and signed into law by Governor Gavin Newsom in
October of that year, the law attempts to address the potential impact
of deepfakes on the democratic process by amending California’s
existing elections code.23 The new law
prohibit[s] a person, committee, or other entity, within 60
days of an election at which a candidate for elective office
will appear on the ballot, from distributing with actual malice
17. J. Fingas, Dutch Politicians Were Tricked by a Deepfake Video Chat, ENGADGET (Apr. 24,
2021), https://www.engadget.com/netherlands-deepfake-video-chat-navalny-212606049.html.
18. Chesney & Citron, supra note 10, at 1785.
19. Hengtee Lim, The Best (and Worst) Deepfakes Developments in 2020, LIONBRIDGE
(Oct. 5, 2020), https://lionbridge.ai/articles/a-look-at-deepfakes-in-2020/ [https://web.archive.org/
web/20201106084900/https://lionbridge.ai/articles/a-look-at-deepfakes-in-2020/]
(“[D]eepfake
detection models can also be used to improve deepfake creation algorithms.”).
20. David Ruiz, Deepfakes Laws and Proposals Flood US, MALWAREBYTES LABS (Jan. 23,
2020), https://blog.malwarebytes.com/artificial-intelligence/2020/01/deepfakes-laws-and-proposa
ls-flood-us/.
21. Cecilia Kang et al., Knowledge Gap Hinders Ability of Congress to Regulate Silicon
Valley, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/12/business/congressfacebook-regulation.html.
22. Assemb. B. 730, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
23. Id.
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materially deceptive audio or visual media of the candidate
with the intent to injure the candidate’s reputation or to
deceive a voter into voting for or against the candidate.24
The purpose behind this policy, as outlined by the law’s sponsor,
California State Assemblymember Marc Berman, is to diminish the
impact of “those who want to wage misinformation campaigns to
confuse voters.”25
The intentions behind the passage of A.B. 730 appear noble—
digital manipulation can impact elections and elected officials, and it
often presents terrifyingly dystopian implications. This law is
especially relevant, as deepfakes have already made substantial waves
in the political sphere. The most high-profile instance yet of a political
deepfake was a May 2019 video of Speaker of the House Nancy
Pelosi, which was slowed down and distorted to make her seem drunk
and disoriented.26 The video quickly went viral, racking up millions of
views overnight, with no mechanism in place to indicate to viewers
that it was false.27 The creator of the video, naturally, remains
unknown. At the time, Facebook28 was widely criticized for refusing
to remove or disclaim the video, allowing it to have broader reach
(without indicating its falsity).29 The social media giant and its fellows
have since implemented new policies to combat deepfakes,30 but
24. Id.
25. Levi Sumagaysay, California Has a New Deepfakes Law in Time for 2020 Election,
MERCURY NEWS (Oct. 4, 2019, 3:14 PM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2019/10/04/californiahas-a-new-deepfakes-law-in-time-for-2020-election/.
26. Shirin Ghaffary, Facebook Is Banning Deepfake Videos, VOX: RECODE (Jan. 7, 2020, 1:15
PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/1/7/21055024/facebook-ban-deepfake-video.
27. Emily Stewart, A Fake Viral Video Makes Nancy Pelosi Look Drunk. Facebook Won’t
Take It Down, VOX: RECODE (May 24, 2019, 3:50 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/5/24/
18638822/nancy-pelosi-doctored-video-drunk-facebook-trump.
28. Facebook is an online social media platform where users can add people they know as
“friends” and share news, information, articles, photos, and videos. See Chaim Gartenberg, What
Is Facebook? Just Ask Mark Zuckerberg, THE VERGE (Mar. 8, 2019, 9:00 AM),
http://theverge.com/2019/3/8/18255269/facebook-mark-zuckerberg-definition-social-medianetwork-sharing-privacy (noting that “Facebook has grown from a site where people in colleges
would accept each other as friends to one of the biggest and most influential companies in the entire
world, one with billions of users and the power to affect political landscapes around the globe”).
29. Stewart, supra note 27; see also Angela Chen, Why Facebook Is Right Not to Take Down
the Doctored Pelosi Video, MIT TECH. REV. (May 28, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com
/2019/05/28/103039/facebook-pelosi-video-misinformation-censorship-free-speech/ (“Critics are
condemning Facebook for not taking down a video of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi that was slowed
to make her seem drunk. But some experts argue that removing the video might have set a precedent
that would actually cause more harm.”).
30. Id.
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legislative efforts like A.B. 730 are attempting to circumvent forced
reliance on independent social media platforms by offering tangible,
legal solutions instead. The problem with A.B. 730, however, lies in
the feebleness of those solutions.
First and foremost, A.B. 730 is redundant. It creates a separate
cause of action for issues which can already be addressed through
California’s extant defamation laws, which are better settled and more
clearly defined. Potential litigants could also utilize the state’s false
light and right of publicity statutes to greater effect. None of these
areas of law require the same stringent time and methodology
requirements as A.B. 730, and all offer a broader library of caselaw
for litigants to turn to.
Second, A.B. 730 presents serious constitutional implications, as
it contradicts a number of Supreme Court rulings on the First
Amendment, particularly as it relates to both political and anonymous
speech. Laws that limit political speech (however misleading that
speech may be), are held to the highest degree of judicial scrutiny.31
A.B. 730 could face challenges for a lack of content neutrality, as well
as for not “provid[ing] other options for communicating the message
[contained in the deepfake].”32 The United States Supreme Court has
previously held that a “State’s fear that voters might make an illadvised choice does not provide the State with a compelling
justification for limiting speech.”33 As a result, “courts therefore have
struck down periodic attempts to ban election-related lies,” which
deepfakes are a form of.34
Finally, and perhaps most crucially, A.B. 730 has an almost
insurmountable feasibility problem. It does not matter whether
malicious deepfakes are technically illegal if their creators cannot be
located or held accountable. Bad actors who are sophisticated enough
to be developing realistic political deepfakes are likewise
sophisticated enough to use encrypted browsers and other means of
technological subterfuge.35 These users’ ability to cover their tracks
makes the law functionally unenforceable. A.B. 730 also places an
31. 13 CAL. JUR. 3D Constitutional Law § 254, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2021).
32. Holly Kathleen Hall, Deepfake Videos: When Seeing Isn’t Believing, 27 CATH. UNIV. J.L.
& TECH. 51, 63 (2018).
33. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 46 (1982); Chesney & Citron, supra note 10, at 1803.
34. Chesney & Citron, supra note 10, at 1803.
35. Andy Greenberg, It’s About to Get Even Easier to Hide on the Dark Web, WIRED
(Jan. 20, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/01/get-even-easier-hide-dark-web.
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enormous burden on litigants due to its intent standard, which requires
they prove “actual malice” in the distribution of the manipulated
media.36 It also places legal responsibility on the individuals who
create the deepfakes, rather than on the platforms which enable their
spread, by carving out an exception for service providers under
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.37 The law also
limits its own strength with a sunset clause, which makes it
enforceable only through 2023.38 This limits any potential impact to
only one presidential and one midterm election (and the more recently
relevant gubernatorial recall).
Deepfakes have created a political problem for which there is
almost no tangible solution. Part II of this Note will provide an
overview of what deepfakes are, outline why they present a
democratic crisis, and discuss how A.B. 730 attempts to address that
crisis—for better and for worse. Part III of this Note will address the
redundancy created by the law, given the existence of already efficient
remedies. Part IV will analyze the constitutional hurdles A.B. 730
faces by restricting political speech. And Part V will present the
challenges facing the enforcement of A.B. 730, given the burdens
facing litigants and protections for internet service providers.
Although A.B. 730 is well-intentioned, the practical impacts of
the law render it essentially toothless. Effective legislation against
deepfakes is still needed, particularly at the federal level, but that is
yet to come.
II. WHAT IS A DEEPFAKE?
Deepfakes are manipulated images, audio, or video, designed to
make the altered media seem authentic.39 They can either amend the
truth just slightly (by modifying an original image or video) or be

36. Assemb. B. 730, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
37. See id. The law amended Section 20010 of the California Elections Code to include a
provision stating that “[t]his section shall not be construed to alter or negate any rights, obligations,
or immunities of an interactive service provider under Section 230 of Title 47 of the United States
Code.”
38. Id.
39. Chesney & Citron, supra note 10, at 1758 (defining deepfakes as “technology [that] . . .
leverages machine-learning algorithms to insert faces and voices into video and audio recordings
of actual people and enables the creation of realistic impersonations out of digital whole cloth. The
end result is realistic-looking video or audio making it appear that someone said or did
something.”).
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forgeries outright.40 Altered media itself is not inherently new
technology (Adobe Photoshop, for example, has existed since 1987).41
Stalin was even known for having various political opponents cleverly
edited out of photos, well before the dawn of the digital age.42 But
until recently, the process of creating manipulated images or video has
been “a slow, painstaking process usually reserved for experts trained
in the vagaries of software like . . . Photoshop or After Effects.”43
Now, the ability to manipulate media has accelerated through the
advent of artificial intelligence (AI) tools, making the technology
easier to use and more widely available to the public.44 The initial
development of deepfake technology was fairly rudimentary, and
involved users taking “off-the-shelf AI tools to paste celebrities’ faces
onto pornographic video clips.”45 This effect was achieved through a
process commonly known as “deep learning.”46
Deep learning is a form of AI or “machine learning,” where
computers learn to perform tasks that previously required human input
or intelligence.47 Deep learning builds on the basic premise of AI, by
having “artificial neural networks . . . learn from large amounts of
data.”48 Neural networks are “a means of doing machine learning, in
which a computer learns to perform some task by analyzing training
examples.”49 Much like humans learn from experience, neural
networks perform tasks repeatedly, improving their output with every
repetition.50 Deepfakes are generated by having these deep learning
algorithms study an original video clip alongside images of the face
40. Id.
41. Adobe Photoshop, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/technology/AdobePhotoshop (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
42. Masha Gessen, The Photo Book that Captured How the Soviet Regime Made the Truth
Disappear, NEW YORKER (July 15, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/photo-booth/thephoto-book-that-captured-how-the-soviet-regime-made-the-truth-disappear.
43. Cade Metz, Internet Companies Prepare to Fight the ‘Deepfake’ Future, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/24/technology/tech-companies-deepfakes.ht
ml.
44. Id.
45. Vincent, supra note 7.
46. Id.
47. Bernard Marr, What Is Deep Learning AI? A Simple Guide With 8 Practical Examples,
FORBES (Oct. 1, 2018, 12:16 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/10/01/what-isdeep-learning-ai-a-simple-guide-with-8-practical-examples/.
48. Id.
49. Larry Hardesty, Explained: Neural Networks, MIT NEWS (Apr. 14, 2017),
https://news.mit.edu/2017/explained-neural-networks-deep-learning-0414.
50. Marr, supra note 47.
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the creator wants to swap into the clip.51 In order to create a deepfake,
“AI-driven software detects the way a subject moves his or her mouth
and face from the source images and duplicates those movements on
the subject of another video.”52 In effect, the computer is training itself
on how to best merge the two, in order to generate a convincing dupe.53
Deepfakes are beginning to progress beyond mere deep learning,
which is primarily used to discriminate between varying data inputs.54
Generative adversarial networks (GANs) are pushing the medium
forward by using two different neural networks in opposition to one
another.55 One develops the deepfake, while the other (the “adversarial
network”), tries to determine flaws in the quality of the clip.56 They
repeat this pattern, until the machine-generated media becomes
concerningly realistic.57 In fact, while DARPA, “the research arm of
the U.S. military, is spending millions to develop tools that detect
deepfakes, their technologists admit that if a creator uses Generative
Adversarial Networks (GANs), their work will in most cases be able
to circumvent any . . . detection software.”58
For now, the process of developing a high quality deepfake still
requires a savvy coder, a powerful computer, and some patience.59 But
the technology is improving at a rapid rate, and commercial
applications are beginning to offer the ability to make certain types of
face swapping content with relative ease.60 Software programs such as
“FakeApp” are available for any internet user to download, and allow
them to make decent (although not seamless) deepfakes.61 This
51. Matt Binder, Deepfakes Are Getting Easier to Make and the Internet’s Just Not Ready,
MASHABLE (Jan. 17, 2020), https://mashable.com/article/deepfake-impersonation-tech-easy-tomake.
52. Herbert B. Dixon Jr., Deepfakes: More Frightening Than Photoshop on Steroids, JUDGES’
J., Spring 2019, at 35, 36.
53. Binder, supra note 51.
54. Elizabeth Caldera, Note, “Reject the Evidence of Your Eyes and Ears”: Deepfakes and
the Law of Virtual Replicants, 50 SETON HALL L. REV. 177, 181 (2019).
55. Chesney & Citron, supra note 10, at 1760.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Jared Schroeder, Free Expression Rationales and the Problem of Deepfakes Within the
E.U. and U.S. Legal Systems, 70 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1171, 1178 (2020).
59. Binder, supra note 51.
60. Ivan Mehta, New Deepfake App Pastes Your Face onto GIFs in Seconds, THE NEXT WEB
(Jan. 13, 2020), https://thenextweb.com/artificial-intelligence/2020/01/13/new-deepfake-apppastes-your-face-onto-gifs-in-seconds/.
61. Matt Binder, The U.S. Defense Department Is Readying for the Battle Against Deepfakes,
MASHABLE (Aug. 7, 2018), https://mashable.com/article/defense-department-fighting-deepfakes;
Caldera, supra note 54, at 185.
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software is built upon TensorFlow, Google’s “internal tool for
developing artificial intelligence algorithms,” which is available to the
public (and often used in its raw form by more skilled deepfake
creators).62 Although the commercial intent of deepfakes technology
is predominately for lighthearted entertainment, the vast majority of
deepfakes (96 percent) have been used to create pornography.63 While
this usage presents its own range of legal challenges, the potential
negative impacts of deepfake technology in the political sphere (as in
the Pelosi video) have raised alarm nationwide, including in
California.
A.B. 730 is a byproduct of legislators’ desire to manage and
contain the impact of malicious deepfakes. Specifically, it is among
the first pieces of legislation related to deepfakes (particularly political
deepfakes) to actually become law.64 It therefore has the ability to set
both beneficial and harmful precedents for how other states (and the
federal government) choose to address the burgeoning technology.
One of the most valuable sections of the law details the state’s
definition of deepfakes (or what it refers to as “materially deceptive
audio or visual media”). A.B. 730 defines this as:
an image or an audio or video recording of a candidate's
appearance, speech, or conduct that has been intentionally
manipulated in a manner such that both of the following
conditions are met:
(1) The image or audio or video recording would falsely
appear to a reasonable person to be authentic.
(2) The image or audio or video recording would cause a
reasonable person to have a fundamentally different
understanding or impression of the expressive content of the
image or audio or video recording than that person would
have if the person were hearing or seeing the unaltered,
original version of the image or audio or video recording.65
This provides a fairly holistic definition of what a deepfake is (an
“image or audio or video recording . . . that has been intentionally
62. Douglas Harris, Note, Deepfakes: False Pornography Is Here and the Law Cannot Protect
You, 17 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 99, 99–100 (2019).
63. Kari Paul, California Makes ‘Deepfake’ Videos Illegal, but Law May Be Hard to Enforce,
THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/oct/07/californiamakes-deepfake-videos-illegal-but-law-may-be-hard-to-enforce.
64. Ruiz, supra note 20.
65. Assemb. B. 730, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
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manipulated . . . [to] falsely appear . . . fundamentally different”).66 It
incorporates the various types of manipulatable media, and describes
the purpose, function, and impact of deepfakes in a straightforward
manner. The strength of this definition is arguably A.B. 730’s best
offering. By having a well-rounded and reasonable set of parameters
for what constitutes a deepfake, the law provides an excellent
precedent for other states or federal lawmakers to draw upon.
Beyond its definitions, A.B. 730 has already begun to make an
impact, particularly in the above-board, commercial deepfakes
market. In September 2020, Impressions (a cell phone app which
allows users to create semi-realistic deepfakes from their phones)
removed the option to create videos with the face of then-President
Donald Trump, citing concerns of non-compliance with A.B. 730.67
Other popular deepfake-creating apps, such as Reface, still allow users
to swap their face onto the faces of political figures, but do not allow
them to create altered videos that appear to be of the politicians
themselves.68 Another one of these apps, Avatarify, allows users to
upload any photo (including of politicians), and then “control the face
of [that] person like a puppet.”69 But, legitimate apps (with formal
protocols, terms and conditions, watermarks, and legal advisors) are
hardly the law’s primary intended target. At its core, A.B. 730 was
designed to “protect voters from being tricked and influenced by
manipulated videos, audio recordings, or images before an election”—
not humorous Trump impressions made by your average citizen on an
iPhone.70 The fact that the law’s only practical application thus far has
been on the business practices of entertainment apps makes its failings
all the more glaring. The stakes are inherently higher for deepfakes
that are spread with manipulative intent.

66. Id.
67. Mikael Thalen, Deepfake App Takes Trump Videos Offline Until After the Election, DAILY
DOT (Sept. 2, 2020, 2:05 PM), https://www.dailydot.com/debug/deepfake-app-trump-2020election.
68. See Natasha Lomas, Deepfake Video App Reface Is Just Getting Started on Shapeshifting
Selfie Culture, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 17, 2020, 10:35 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2020/08/17/dee
pfake-video-app-reface-is-just-getting-started-on-shapeshifting-selfie-culture.
69. Geoffrey A. Fowler, Anyone with an iPhone Can Now Make Deepfakes. We Aren’t Ready
for What Happens Next, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/technology/2021/03/25/deepfake-video-apps/.
70. Elections: Deceptive Audio or Visual Media, supra note 15, at 6.
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III. A.B. 730 IS REDUNDANT, GIVEN EXISTING STATE LAW
In modifying section 20010 of the California Elections Code,
A.B. 730 sets out two possible causes of action in relation to political
deepfakes.
First, any “registered voter” can file for a temporary restraining
order, seeking to enjoin the “publication, distribution, or broadcasting
of any campaign material” in violation of the law.71 This form of
unrelated third-party claim is one of the only non-redundant portions
of the statute.72 Second, a candidate for public office who appears in a
digitally manipulated form of media can seek both injunctive relief
and damages.73 This type of claim is equivalent to other causes of
action codified in California, such as defamation, false light, and even
the right of publicity.
The ability for a private citizen (so long as they are registered to
vote) to seek a temporary restraining order against a deepfake is one
of the only legally innovative portions of A.B. 730. There is no
requirement for this citizen to be featured in the manipulated media or
have any connection to anyone featured in the media.74 In practice,
this means that anyone could file a complaint on behalf of an elected
official (so long as the other requirements of the law, in terms of
timing and content, are met). This opens the door to possibly endless
frivolous lawsuits, which would further burden California’s already
taxed court system.75
By contrast, unrelated third parties cannot file actions for other
types of reputation-oriented harm in California, such as defamation or
false light.76 Even for a tort law claim for violation of the right of
publicity, outside persons can only file suit if the issue pertains to

71. Cal. Assemb. B. 730.
72. Third parties, such as relatives of a deceased person, cannot sue for defamation under
California law. See Kelly v. Johnson Publ’g Co., 325 P.2d 659, 662 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958) (holding
that “[d]efamation of a deceased person does not give rise to a civil right of action at common law
in favor of the surviving spouse, family, or relatives, who are not themselves defamed”).
73. Cal. Assemb. B. 730.
74. See id.
75. Micha Star Liberty, Op-Ed: Why the State Court System Is Experiencing a Pandemic
Meltdown, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2020, 3:05 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-0907/courts-and-covid-hed.
76. For defamation, see Kelly, 325 P.2d at 662; false light is one type of invasion of privacy
tort. See Forsher v. Bugliosi, 608 P.2d 716, 725 (Cal. 1980). The right of privacy “cannot be
asserted by anyone other than the person whose privacy is invaded.” 6A CAL. JUR. 3D Assault and
Other Willful Torts § 143, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2021).
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postmortem publicity rights and the moving party is a legal heir or
relative.77
Putting the novelty of third party filings aside, the second cause
of action (for political candidates) in A.B. 730 is functionally
redundant. Defamation and false light already meet a would-be
plaintiff’s needs, and depending on the particulars, so too might the
right of publicity. A.B. 730 could also be considered redundant in light
of federal copyright law. The copyright holder of a manipulated piece
of media could file a claim against a deepfake’s creator (if they are
able to find them), or at the very least, send a Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA) takedown notice to internet service providers
to stop its spread.78 These redundancies serve to limit the impact of
the law, and could possibly drive potential plaintiffs away from using
it, given the more established options available.
A. A.B. 730 Is Redundant Under California’s Defamation Statutes
California’s Civil Code provides a cause action for defamation,
which is defined as “a false and unprivileged publication that exposes
the plaintiff ‘to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes
him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him
in his occupation.’”79 Defamation is effected by way of either libel
(defamation in written form) or slander (oral defamation).80 For public
figures, defamation requires a showing of actual malice—“knowledge
that [the statement] was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false.”81 Similar to the false publication requirement for
defamation, A.B. 730 requires the publication or distribution of
campaign material that “create[s] a false representation.”82 And
because A.B. 730 also concerns the reputations of public figures, it too
77. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (Deering 2021).
78. A DMCA takedown occurs “[w]hen content is removed from a website at the request of
the owner of the content or the owner of the copyright of the content. It is a well established,
accepted, internet standard followed by website owners and internet service providers.” What is a
DMCA Takedown?, DMCA.COM, https://www.dmca.com/FAQ/What-is-a-DMCA-Takedown (last
visited Apr. 11, 2021).
79. Brodeur v. Atlas Ent., Inc., 204 Cal. Rptr. 3d 483, 492 (Ct. App. 2016) (citations omitted).
80. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 44, 45(a), 46.
81. Dickinson v. Cosby, 250 Cal. Rptr. 3d 350, 364 (Ct. App. 2019); see also N.Y. Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–81 (1964) (stating that a public official cannot recover “for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made
with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not”).
82. Assemb. B. 730, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
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requires a demonstration of actual malice, which is defined by the
statute to mean “the knowledge that the image of a person has been
superimposed on a picture or photograph to create a false
representation, or a reckless disregard of whether or not the image of
a person has been superimposed on a picture or photograph to create
a false representation.”83
Another important similarity between the causes of action is
believability. A defamation case can turn on whether the statement in
question is believable as fact or clearly a joke.84 For example, “a
speech made after dinner, understood by all present as a harmless joke,
may amount to libel when it is published in a newspaper and reaches
those who do not understand the circumstances.”85 Comparably, A.B.
730 requires the “materially deceptive audio or visual media” to
“cause a reasonable person to have a fundamentally different
understanding or impression of the expressive content of the image or
audio or video recording than that person would have if the person
were hearing or seeing the unaltered, original version of the image or
audio or video recording.”86
In light of the similar requirements, a candidate for public office
could more easily use existing defamation law to seek either injunctive
relief or damages, given the wide body of caselaw which litigants can
already turn to for support. This overlap is additionally relevant given
the time limitation contained in A.B. 730—the material in question
must be distributed within sixty days of an election.87 This means that
if the material were distributed sixty-one days before an election, A.B.
730 would not apply (but defamation law would). Using traditional
defamation law would instead allow a plaintiff greater flexibility,
while achieving the same type of outcomes (removal of the deepfake,
financial compensation, etc.).
B. A.B. 730 Is Redundant, Given California’s Existing Body of
“False Light” Law
Even if a litigant could not meet the standards required for
defamation, A.B. 730 is still redundant given the invasion of privacy
83. Id.
84. Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52–54 (1988); Arno v. Stewart, 54 Cal. Rptr.
392, 396 (Ct. App. 1966).
85. Arno, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 397.
86. Cal. Assemb. B. 730.
87. Id.
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tort of false light. The elements needed for this claim are “a portrayal
of the plaintiff which casts him or her in a false light and that is
objectionable to a reasonable person, and publication of the
portrayal.”88 The distinction between false light and defamation is that
the “plaintiff is not required to prove that the defendant knowingly
directed the portrayal at him or her.”89 In effect, this makes it easier to
state a claim for false light than it does to make a claim under A.B.
730, because there is neither an intent standard nor election timing to
consider. Casting in a false light is parallel to the “false representation”
requirement of A.B. 730, as are the reasonable person and publication
requirements. Again, although some of the elements of the two laws
are similar, the substantially easier (and likely more fruitful) course of
action would be for a litigant to file a false light claim because of the
greater volume of precedent and decreased burden.
C. A.B. 730 May Be Redundant Under California Right of Publicity
Law
California boasts some of the most robust and comprehensive
right of publicity laws in the United States.90 The right of publicity is
defined as “the inherent right of every human being to control the
commercial use of his or her identity.”91 Among California’s right of
publicity laws is section 3344 of the California Civil Code, which
provides a cause of action for “knowingly us[ing] another’s name,
voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner . . . without
such person’s prior consent.”92 This statute would allow a candidate
for public office to file a claim for the nonconsensual use of their
voice, photograph, or likeness in a deepfake if that deepfake was being
used for commercial purposes or in advertisements.93 This again
mirrors A.B. 730, which prohibits deepfakes in campaign materials
specifically. The law explicitly defines “campaign materials” to

88. CAL. CIV. PRAC. TORTS Common Law Action § 20:12, Westlaw (database updated Nov.
2020).
89. Id.
90. Jennifer Rothman, California, ROTHMAN’S ROADMAP TO THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
(updated Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com/law/california.
91. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY & ROGER E. SCHECHTER, RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY
2D § 1:3, Westlaw (database updated May 2020).
92. CAL. CIV. CODE. § 3344 (Deering 2021).
93. Id.
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include “advertisement[s] in a newspaper or other periodical,
television commercial, or computer image.”94
However, a right of publicity claim also requires an unapproved
user to be exploiting the plaintiff’s identity for financial gain.95 This
does not necessarily bar deepfakes from falling under the auspices of
right of publicity law, but it does make it significantly more unlikely
in the political sphere. It would be extraordinarily challenging to prove
perpetrators, who are nearly impossible to locate in the first place,
were directly profiting off the proliferation of a political deepfake.
This is in part because “the harms associated with deep fakes do not
typically generate direct financial gain for their creators.”96 Even if the
perpetrator were to be, for example, an opposing campaign, this would
still not necessarily mean they were receiving a commercial (as
opposed to political) benefit from the spread of the deepfake. That
being said, if an opposing campaign were to use a deepfake of
unknown origin in their advertising (without previously determining
its veracity), the candidate featured could have a viable right of
publicity claim against them (without being bogged down by the
timing and intent constraints of A.B. 730).
Although this overlap is more limited, it once again demonstrates
the redundancies between A.B. 730 and existing law.
D. A.B. 730 Is Redundant Under the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act
Not all deepfakes are original works—many exploit already
existing, copyrighted content.97 For deepfake victims, this “open[s]
the door to monetary damages and a notice-and-takedown procedure
that can result in removal of the offending content.”98
Deepfakes that contain copyrighted material would fall under the
purview of the DMCA.99 The DMCA is a federal statute which grants
protections to copyright owners whose media is being illegally
proliferated online.100
94. Assemb. B. 730, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
95. Chesney & Citron, supra note 10, at 1794.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1793.
98. Id.
99. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
100. Id.
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The statute contains “anti-circumvention” provisions, which
allow for the removal or “takedown” of copyrighted material spread
by nonowners.101 If a copyright holder discovers their media online,
they can send a DMCA takedown notice “to a service provider
requesting the provider to remove material that is infringing their
copyright[].”102 A service provider can mean a true internet service
provider (like Comcast or Spectrum), or a general website, search
engine, or social media network (like Google or YouTube).103
DMCA takedown notices are not limited to copyright holders
alone: “a takedown request can be made by anyone who is the subject
of a video—a provision arguably broad enough to include all deepfake
victims.”104 Because of this provision, a victim of a political deepfake
(regardless of whether they own the copyright to the video) would
likely be able to remove their media from the internet by issuing a
takedown notice.105 Simplifying matters further, a formal copyright
registration is not required to issue a DMCA takedown notice.106
This would be a far easier path for a victim than utilizing A.B.
730. They would only have to demonstrate their presence in the video
or their copyright ownership, as opposed to locating the perpetrator,
establishing “actual malice,” etc. This also allows for a more
immediate and efficient response to a political deepfake, especially if
the victim’s first concern is getting the media away from vulnerable
eyes.
Of course, this method is not foolproof. Whoever posted the video
(if they are willing to come forward) can file a counter-notice,107 and
101. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/d
mca (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
102. What Is the DMCA Notice and Takedown Process?, COPYRIGHT ALL.,
https://copyrightalliance.org/ca_faq_post/dmca-notice-and-takedown-process (last visited Apr. 11,
2021).
103. Id.
104. Delfino, supra note 5, at 936.
105. Although this strategy could come up against fair use arguments by the creators of the
altered media, they would have to come forward in order to make this assertion, which is unlikely
given the highly anonymous nature of deepfakes creation. Additionally, the inherently malicious
nature of political deepfakes would likely undermine any legitimate fair use claim.
106. See What Is the DMCA Notice and Takedown Process?, supra note 102.
107. If an alleged infringer believes, in good faith, that his or her activity is not infringing, he
or she can send a “counter notice to the service provider explaining why they disagree with the
copyright owner. Like the takedown notice, there are certain elements that must be contained in a
DMCA
counter
notice.”
DMCA
Counter-Notice
Process,
COPYRIGHT ALL.,
https://copyrightalliance.org/education/copyright-law-explained/the-digital-millenniumcopyright-act-dmca/dmca-counter-notice-process/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2021).
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not every copy of the media may be able to be tracked down and
removed. But this still demonstrates yet another possible alternative
cause of action available to litigants, with fewer limitations than A.B.
730.
Redundancy in-and-of-itself is not necessarily problematic. But
A.B. 730 contains greater flaws than mere repetition.
IV. A.B. 730 PLACES POTENTIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH
In general, “the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content.”108 Because A.B. 730 explicitly codifies
a form of expression-based restriction, it would be unlikely to
withstand a constitutional challenge on First Amendment grounds.
Although the constitutionality of the law has yet to be tested, possible
challenges abound.109 This is primarily because laws curtailing speech
based on its “communicative content . . . are presumptively
unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves
that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”110
Manipulated media—whether in image, audio, and video form—
is inherently communicative content, protected by the First
Amendment.111 Deepfakes specifically can communicate messages on
topics ranging from humorous to pornographic to political. The
communicative nature of deepfakes makes them generally protectable
by the First Amendment, which is incorporated against the states via
the Fourteenth Amendment (meaning it applies to California state
laws).112 The curtailing of deepfakes outlined by A.B. 730 is explicitly
dependent on their content. Deepfakes on the whole, are not prohibited
108. Ashcroft v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (quoting Boulger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983)).
109. As of May 1, 2021.
110. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015) (first citing R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992)); and then citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115, 118 (1991)).
111. See Charlotte Stanton et al., The Legal, Ethical, and Efficacy Dimensions of Managing
Synthetic and Manipulated Media, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Nov. 15, 2019),
https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/11/15/legal-ethical-and-efficacy-dimensions-of-managingsynthetic-and-manipulated-media-pub-80439 (“An outright legal ban on synthetic and manipulated
media would violate the First Amendment because ‘falsity alone’ does not remove expression from
First Amendment protection, and many digital falsifications would be constitutionally protected
speech.”).
112. Reed, 576 U.S. at 163.
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by the law—rather only campaign materials that “contain[] (1) a
picture or photograph of a person or persons into which the image of
a candidate for public office is superimposed or (2) a picture or
photograph of a candidate for public office into which the image of
another person or persons is superimposed.”113 This means A.B. 730
governs not just political speech, but also false speech. Because A.B.
730 is explicitly “content based,” this:
requires a court to consider whether a regulation of speech
‘on its face’ draws distinctions based on the message a
speaker conveys. . . . Some facial distinctions based on a
message are obvious, defining regulated speech by particular
subject matter, and others are more subtle, defining regulated
speech by its function or purpose. Both are distinctions
drawn based on the message a speaker conveys, and,
therefore, are subject to strict scrutiny.114
Restrictions against content-based speech, and political speech in
particular, are held to the highest standard of judicial oversight—strict
scrutiny.115 Thus, “[a] law that is content based on its face is subject
to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive,
content-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas
contained’ in the regulated speech.”116 Strict scrutiny is required
whenever the government proposes a law which may impinge on a
fundamental freedom or interest.117 Therefore, “[c]ontent-based
laws—those that target speech based on its communicative content—
are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only [by
meeting the criteria of strict scrutiny].”118 In order to survive a strict
scrutiny analysis, the government must demonstrate that the law
furthers a “compelling government interest” and is “narrowly
tailored.”119
A.B. 730 would present a particular challenge for the
government, in terms of meeting the standards required for strict
scrutiny. This is because the law is not only focused on political
113. Assemb. B. 730, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
114. Reed, 576 U.S. at 163–64 (internal citations omitted).
115. 13 CAL. JUR. 3D Constitutional Law § 254, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2021).
116. Reed, 576 U.S. at 165 (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S.
410, 429 (1993)).
117. Id. at 163.
118. Id.
119. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010).
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speech, but rather a subset of it: campaign speech. As Citizens United
v. Federal Election Commission120 explains, “[t]he First Amendment
‘“has its fullest and most urgent application” to speech uttered during
a campaign for political office.’”121
A. A.B. 730 Does Not Further a “Compelling Government Interest”
Defining a “compelling government interest” is easier said than
done. The Supreme Court has never provided clear guidelines as to
what makes a government interest compelling or not.122 Interests that
have been defined as “compelling” include national security,123
“allowing governmental entities to perform their functions,”124 and
maintaining a stable political system.125
In the context of A.B. 730, the government could propose a
number of state interests to justify the law, including political stability,
the regulation of elections, and stopping the spread of misinformation.
Many of these were in fact raised by the California State Senate in its
Committee on Elections and Constitutional Amendments’ digest on
the proposed law.126 However, any of those interests would be
mitigated by a series of Supreme Court cases which undermine the
government’s ability to regulate electoral speech—even if it is false.
For example, in Brown v. Hartlage,127 the Supreme Court held
that in relation to a Kentucky election regulation, “preserving the
integrity of [the] electoral process[]” was only a “legitimate” state
interest, and not a “compelling” one.128 Specifically, “fear that voters
might make an ill-advised choice does not provide the State with a
compelling justification for limiting speech. It is simply not the
function of government to ‘select which issues are worth discussing or

120. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
121. Id. at 339 (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989)).
122. Robert T. Miller, What Is a Compelling Governmental Interest? 1 (Univ. of Iowa Legal
Stud. Rsch. Paper No. 2018-1, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=314916
2.
123. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 225 (1944).
124. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 341.
125. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974).
126. See generally Elections: Deceptive Audio or Visual Media: Hearing on Assembly Bill No.
730 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. 6–7 (Cal. 2019) (as amended
June 25, 2019) (stating that many authors and opponents of the bill agree that election integrity
constitutes a compelling government interest).
127. 456 U.S. 45 (1982).
128. Id. at 52–54.
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debating.’”129 Based on this precedent, regulating altered media, even
if that media could manipulate voters into making an “ill-advised
choice,” would not satisfy a compelling government purpose.
Moreover, in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,130 the Supreme
Court struck down Ohio state laws that prohibited “certain false
statement[s] during the course of any campaign for nomination or
election to public office or office of a political party.”131 The facts of
that case prove particularly relevant to A.B. 730. Susan B. Anthony
List is an anti-abortion organization, which published a press release
asserting that the then recently-passed Affordable Care Act would
authorize “taxpayer-funded abortion.”132 In the statement, the
organization included the name of an Ohio Congressman after he
voted in favor of the Act.133 The Congressman filed a complaint after
the release damaged his reelection campaign.134 The Ohio Elections
Commission determined that the claim regarding government funded
abortions was false, and therefore that the organization violated the
statute (after the Congressman withdrew his complaint, the District
court lifted the stay and Susan B. Anthony List amended its complaint
asserting the statutes were unconstitutional by chilling speech).135 Due
to this dispute, the Court found that “the ‘practical effect’ of the Ohio
false statement scheme is ‘to permit a private complainant . . . to gain
a campaign advantage without ever having to prove the falsity of a
statement.’”136 The Court reasoned that silencing Susan B. Anthony
List’s speech, even if that speech was potentially false, was
unconstitutional and could create electoral unfairness towards other,
non-targeted candidates.137
In contrast to preventing false speech, the Supreme Court has held
that “maintaining a stable political system” qualifies as a compelling
government interest.138 California could argue that in curbing the
spread of misinformation via deepfakes, A.B. 730 is doing just that.
But, following the logic used by the Court in Eu v. San Francisco
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 60.
573 U.S. 149 (2014).
Id. at 152–53 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 153–54.
Id. at 154.
Id.
Id. at 162–63.
Id. at 165 (omission in original).
Id. at 164–66.
Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 226 (1989).
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County Democratic Central Committee,139 California would have to
demonstrate how this law directly improved the stability of the state’s
political system.140 Moreover, the Court asked the state of California
then—and any court would presumably ask the state now—“what
makes the California system so peculiar that it is virtually the only
State that has determined that such a ban is necessary”?141 In this case,
other states have implemented similar laws (namely Texas, with
Senate Bill 751),142 but this type of policy specifically targeting
political deepfakes is hardly widespread.143 Even if this interest was
compelling, a court would still have to assess whether the rationale
was compelling enough to justify the rather heavy burden A.B. 730
places on free speech.144 Critiquing candidates is one of the most
central tenets of election discourse, and not all forms of manipulated
media involving valid candidate critiques would necessarily fall
within the exceptions outlined by A.B. 730 (such as satire or
parody).145
Aside from whether the state developed its own compelling
interest, there are certain types of free speech restrictions the Supreme
Court has upheld. Namely, “content-based restrictions on speech have
been permitted, as a general matter, only when confined to the few
‘historic and traditional categories [of expression] long familiar to the
bar.’”146 These categories include incitement of violence, obscenity,
fraud, defamation of private citizens, “speech integral to criminal
conduct,” and child pornography, among others.147 Political deepfakes
generally do not fall into any of these categories.
B. A.B. 730 Is Not “Narrowly Tailored”
Once a state has articulated how a law in question furthers a
“compelling government interest,” the next requirement of strict
139. 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
140. Id. at 226.
141. Id.
142. S.B. 751, 86th Leg. (Tex. 2019).
143. Carolyn Toto & Taylor Keating, Protecting Elections: Regulating Deepfakes in Politics,
JD SUPRA (Aug. 7, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/protecting-elections-regulating39567. Unlike in California, there has already been some activity related to Texas Senate Bill 751.
Houston Mayor Sylvester Turner asked the city’s district attorney to investigate his political
opponents use of edited text messages and photos of him in a television campaign ad. Id.
144. See Eu, 489 U.S. at 222.
145. See Assemb. B. 730, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
146. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (alteration in original).
147. Id.
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scrutiny is that the law be “narrowly tailored” to meet that purpose.148
For a law restricting content-based speech to be “narrowly tailored,”
it must not “burden substantially more speech than is necessary to
further the government's legitimate interests.”149 Moreover, the
government must show that “alternative measures that burden
substantially less speech would fail to achieve the government's
interests, not simply that the chosen route is easier.”150 This
requirement forces the government to avoid silencing speech for mere
convenience, and “prevents the government from too readily
‘sacrific[ing] speech for efficiency.’”151
A.B. 730 substantially burdens electoral speech by eliminating all
legitimate uses for manipulated videos involving candidates for public
office, unless those videos fall into a few narrow exceptions (such as
parody or satire).152 It limits valid critiques of candidates which could
occur through the medium without necessarily being “funny.”
Moreover, A.B. 730 could “prohibit the use of altered content to
reenact true events that were not recorded or could bar a candidate’s
use of their own altered videos” in counter-attack ads.153
Several of the political groups which opposed A.B. 730, including
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and California
Newspaper Publishers Association (CNPA), were quick to draw
comparisons between A.B. 730 and the Ohio statutes in Susan B.
Anthony List.154 After that case was remanded by the Supreme Court,
it was once again reviewed by the Sixth Circuit. In their subsequent
holding, the Sixth Circuit pointed out that the Ohio laws were
overturned “because they [were] not narrowly tailored in their (1)
timing, (2) lack of a screening process for frivolous complaints, (3)
application to non-material statements, (4) application to commercial
intermediaries,
and
(5)
over-inclusiveness
and
underinclusiveness.”155 Both the ACLU and CNPA argued that these issues
148. McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 477 (2014).
149. Id. at 486 (quoting Ward. v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)).
150. Id. at 495.
151. Id. at 486 (alteration in original) (quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc.,
487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988)).
152. Assemb. B. 730, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
153. David E. Fink & Sarah E. Diamond, Deepfakes: 2020 and Beyond, THE RECORDER
(Sept. 3, 2020), https://www.law.com/therecorder/2020/09/03/deepfakes-2020-and-beyond.
154. Elections: Deceptive Audio or Visual Media: Hearing on Assembly Bill No. 730 Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 126, at 7.
155. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 814 F.3d 466, 474 (6th Cir. 2016).
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were equally applicable to A.B. 730 (particularly because it was
overbroad).156
The most directly comparable issue between the two laws is their
timing. The Ohio law posed issues because “there [was] no guarantee
the administrative or criminal proceedings [would] conclude before
the election or within time for the candidate’s campaign to recover
from any false information that was disseminated.”157 This meant that
decisions regarding the outcome of any electoral damage would be
made post-election, when it was too late to have an impact.158
Similarly, with A.B. 730, the law bars the distribution of deepfakes
“within 60 days of an election.”159 This leaves very little time for
effective adjudication before an election would actually take place,
even if best-case scenario, a deepfake was disseminated the full sixty
days in advance.
In terms of overbreadth, California’s State Senate acknowledged
the ACLU and CNPA’s concerns in their Senate Judiciary Committee
Report on the initial bill.160 Ultimately, they narrowed the breadth of
the bill slightly by swapping the original intent standard of the law
(“knowing or reckless”) for a more stringent one (“actual malice”).161
This decision was logical in light of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,162
which established public figures must demonstrate “actual malice” in
order to sue for defamation (and political candidates are inherently
public figures).163 The Committee also debated narrowing the bill by
removing the ability for any registered voter to bring suit, so as to
156. Elections: Deceptive Audio or Visual Media: Hearing on Assembly Bill No. 730 Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 126.
157. Susan B. Anthony List, 814 F.3d at 474.
158. Id.
159. Assemb. B. 730, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
160. Elections: Deceptive Audio or Visual Media: Hearing on Assembly Bill No. 730 Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 126, at 7.
161. Id. at 8.
162. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
163. Id. at 279–80. The Court cited a Kansas Supreme Court decision as part of the rationale
for this requirement, which noted that
[i]t is of the utmost consequence that the people should discuss the character and
qualifications of candidates for their suffrages. The importance to the state and to society
of such discussions is so vast, and the advantages derived are so great, that they more
than counterbalance the inconvenience of private persons whose conduct may be
involved, and occasional injury to the reputations of individuals must yield to the public
welfare, although at times such injury may be great. The public benefit from publicity is
so great, and the chance of injury to private character so small, that such discussion must
be privileged.
Id. at 281.
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diminish the risk of frivolous complaints, but ultimately decided
against doing so.164
Moreover, the government could find a slew of alternative
approaches which would burden less speech and ultimately achieve
the same ends. One approach would even be to simply amend existing
defamation statutes to incorporate manipulated media targeted at
candidates for office, and then apply traditional defamation
requirements to political deepfakes.
Previously, the Supreme Court has not hesitated to overturn state
statutes which are overbroad in their speech restrictions (especially as
applied to technology). For example, in Packingham v. North
Carolina,165 the Court assessed a North Carolina law that prohibited
registered sex offenders from using social media.166 The Court held
that although the law intended to protect children by banning sex
offenders from social media outright, its practical application
excessively burdened their First Amendment rights.167 An inability to
use social media meant barring them from access to current events,
job offerings, educational resources, and more, and prevented them
“from engaging in the legitimate exercise of First Amendment
rights.”168
Similarly here, A.B. 730 is overbroad in its restriction on
deepfakes as a form of expression. Although the intent is to protect
candidates from malicious content, in practice, the law would bar all
deepfakes that feature their likeness. Like in Packingham, this results
in an overbroad restriction on speech itself, unless that speech falls
under one of A.B. 730’s exceptions (such as parody or adding a
disclaimer to the deepfake). And while the legitimate uses for political
deepfakes outside the exceptions may be few—namely artistic
expression or political critique—these remain valid, protected forms
of speech.
Furthermore, the state also does not narrowly tailor who can sue.
Victims—namely, political candidates—are not the only people who
can file a cause of action under this statute.169 Any registered voter can
164. Elections: Deceptive Audio or Visual Media: Hearing on Assembly Bill No. 730 Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 126, at 8.
165. 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
166. Id. at 1733.
167. Id. at 1737.
168. Id.
169. Assemb. B. 730, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
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take umbrage, meaning the “victims” themselves do not even have to
take issue with the speech in order for it to be censored. This issue of
“frivolous complaints” was a problem in Susan B. Anthony List, and
was repeatedly raised to the California Senate Judiciary Committee,
to no avail.170
C. Anonymous Speech is Also Protected by the First Amendment
A.B. 730 relies on the assumption that the creators of the
deepfakes can and will be located, and ultimately held accountable for
the media they create. The unrealistic nature of this premise is
discussed in Section V below.
However, this premise also confronts another subsidiary First
Amendment right—the protection of anonymous speech. The United
States Supreme Court has long protected and valued anonymous
speech, noting that it has “played an important role in the progress of
mankind.”171 The Court particularly emphasized the fact that
anonymous speech allows for safe criticism of oppressive leaders,
laws, and policies.172
The right to anonymously speak has serious implications in the
political sphere. Fear of retaliation, or unpopularity of ideas (or their
speakers) can severely hamper political speech.173 In fact, “even in the
field of political rhetoric, where ‘the identity of the speaker is an
important component of many attempts to persuade,’ the most
effective advocates have sometimes opted for anonymity.”174 The
Federalist Papers themselves provide a great example of this, given
their originally anonymous nature.175
The majority of deepfakes are anonymous by nature, which grants
them a certain gravitas and protection. The ideas contained within
political deepfakes may be either false or fringe, but that does not
diminish their protected right to be expressed.

170. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 814 F.3d 466, 474 (6th Cir. 2016); Elections:
Deceptive Audio or Visual Media: Hearing on Assembly Bill No. 730 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, supra note 126, at 7.
171. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960).
172. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995).
173. Id. at 342–43.
174. Id. (internal citations omitted).
175. Id. at 342.

(13) 54.4_TASHMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

11/18/21 12:45 PM

THE INTERNET’S BURGEONING POLITICAL CRISIS

1417

V. CHALLENGES OF ENFORCING INTERNET CRIMES
Putting aside questions of redundancy and constitutionality,
perhaps the most pressing problem with A.B. 730 is that it is
borderline impossible to implement. First, any lawsuit related to
deepfakes must overcome the hurdle of actually determining a
perpetrator.176 Internet crimes are notoriously challenging to
prosecute, given their anonymous nature, and deepfakes all the moreso.177 Unlike revenge porn deepfakes, where there is a smaller pool of
possible suspects (given the traditionally limited initial sharing of
intimate photos or videos), political deepfakes could be sourced from
a wide variety of publicly available media. Political deepfakes are
easily created by strangers, political operatives, or foreign nationals—
all of whom may be using advanced software to hide any trail of the
manipulated media’s origin.178
Another enforcement issue relates to the burden of proof imposed
by A.B. 730’s intent standard. Even if a prospective litigant can locate
the creator of a malicious deepfake, they still have the burden of
showing that creator acted with “actual malice.”179 Although selecting
this intent standard was a sound choice by lawmakers trying to ward
off constitutional challenges, it inadvertently created a substantial
evidentiary burden for victims. Finally, and perhaps most crucially,
A.B. 730 pointlessly places the responsibility solely on individual
deepfake creators, rather than the social media platforms that spread
and amplify their creations.180 A malicious political deepfake, without
a mechanism for widespread sharing, can only go so far. Without
social media’s ability to transmit deepfakes (and other forms of
misinformation) without warnings or fact checking, they would have
little impact. Despite this, Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act all but exempts these platforms from any liability for
their spread, meaning litigants’ only real recourse is to find a
deepfake’s specific creator.181
176. Assemb. B. 730, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
177. Matt Reynolds, Courts and Lawyers Struggle with Growing Prevalence of Deepfakes,
ABA J. (June 9, 2020, 9:29 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/courts-and-lawyersstruggle-with-growing-prevalence-of-deepfakes.
178. Chesney & Citron, supra note 10, at 1804.
179. Cal. Assemb. B. 730.
180. Id.
181. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230 (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
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A. Locating Perpetrators Presents Factual and Logistical
Challenges
Internet crimes are often successful because they can be executed
anonymously. There is a myriad of ways to become anonymous
online, both for technological novices and experts alike. There are
more elementary methods, such as changing your email, going by a
false name, or using a private browser.182 More advanced methods
involve using proxy servers or virtual private networks (VPNs) to hide
IP addresses (which link certain devices to their owners or
locations).183 In particular, the software Tor is known for its ability to
mask users’ identities, making it a favorite among criminals and
privacy advocates alike.184 When using proxy servers, VPNs, or other
similar technology, “the IP addresses connected to posts may be
impossible to find and trace back to the responsible parties.”185 As
such, plaintiffs or law enforcement officials may be completely unable
to track down who created the deepfake at all. Furthermore, in terms
of proliferating the deepfake, many social media sites—such as Reddit
and Twitter—nominally allow anonymous use.186 This adds further
challenges to tracing the original malicious distributor of a deepfake.
In terms of electoral deepfakes, many of the parties who have the
greatest incentive to create such media are foreign powers or
entities.187 This too creates an additional enforcement challenge:
[t]he most capable actors with motive and means to deploy
deep fakes in a high-impact manner in an election setting will
include the intelligence services of foreign governments
engaging in such activity as a form of covert action, as we
saw with Russia in relation to the American election of 2016.
The prospect of a criminal prosecution in the United States
will mean little to foreign government agents involved in
such activity.188

182. Deb Shinder, Online Anonymity: Balancing the Needs to Protect Privacy and Prevent
Cybercrime, TECHREPUBLIC (Sept. 20, 2011, 2:00 AM), https://www.techrepublic.com/blog/itsecurity/online-anonymity-balancing-the-needs-to-protect-privacy-and-prevent-cybercrime.
183. Dan Rafter, Proxy vs. VPN: 4 Differences You Should Know, NORTONLIFELOCK,
https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-privacy-proxy-vs-vpn.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
184. Chesney & Citron, supra note 10, at 1792.
185. Id.
186. Delfino, supra note 5, at 899.
187. Chesney & Citron, supra note 10, at 1804.
188. Id.
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A.B. 730 can thereby have little impact on some of the most effective
sources of political deepfake creation.
B. Litigants Will Struggle to Meet A.B. 730’s Burden of Proof
Another significant barrier to enforcement is A.B. 730’s intent
standard. The law requires the deepfake to have been distributed with
“actual malice.”189 It defines “actual malice” to mean “the knowledge
that the image of a person has been superimposed on a picture or
photograph to create a false representation, or a reckless disregard of
whether or not the image of a person has been superimposed on a
picture or photograph to create a false representation.”190 For a party
to be held liable under A.B. 730, they have to not only know what they
are spreading is false, but recklessly disregard that fact (and its
implications). This means that the millions of people who repost or reshare a widely proliferated deepfake across social networking sites
would not be held liable for distributing the deepfake. So, while the
deepfake can be shared millions of times by gullible social media
users, without finding the original poster there is no cause of action.
This standard—although appropriately narrowed from a free
speech perspective—creates an extraordinary burden for plaintiffs
seeking to pursue litigation under A.B. 730. Finding the original
distributor is a challenge enough, on top of trying to discover evidence
which points to actual malice. Even if litigants or law enforcement
could track down the origin of the deepfake, they would still face
numerous logistical hurdles proving intent in a court of law.
C. A.B. 730’s Pointless Disclaimers May Allow for Greater Spread
of Misinformation
A.B. 730 does provide some exceptions for the dissemination of
manipulated media. Specifically, the law carves out an exemption for
the use of a specific disclaimer.191 Manipulated media accompanied
by the statement, “This _____ has been manipulated,” is allowed (the
blank can be filled with either “image,” “video,” or “audio”).192 The

189.
190.
191.
192.

Assemb. B. 730, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
Id.
Id.
Id.

(13) 54.4_TASHMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1420

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

11/18/21 12:45 PM

[Vol. 54:1391

law further outlines the size the disclaimer must be, along with a series
of other logistical requirements.193
This requirement is unlikely to mean anything to malicious
creators and is even ripe for abuse. Actors who are developing
deepfakes with the intent to damage political candidates are not going
to label their content as manipulated because it undermines the entire
point of their actions. Even worse, this disclaimer could be used by
malicious distributors to their advantage. For example, if a deepfakes
creator released the original, unaltered form of a video with the
manipulated disclaimer, and the manipulated version without it, this
would inevitably sow confusion among media consumers.194 This
“[c]reates a false expectation that voters can trust images and videos
unless they are labeled as manipulated, when in fact the bill only
applies to a fraction of the misleading images and recordings that
could influence an election.”195 While the disclaimer is meant to allow
free speech while curtailing disinformation, the process is rife for
manipulation and abuse, rendering the disclaimer pointless.
D. A.B. 730 Misplaces Responsibility for the Spread of Deepfakes by
Carving Out Section 230 Immunity
A final enforcement problem for A.B. 730 derives from who it
chooses to blame. The law pins responsibility for the dissemination of
deepfakes on individual bad actors, rather than on the platforms who
facilitate the dissemination itself. The law “shall not be construed to
alter or negate any rights, obligations, or immunities of an interactive
service provider under Section 230 of Title 47 of the United States
Code.”196 Section 230 of Title 47, better known as the
Communications Decency Act (CDA) states that “[n]o provider or
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher
or speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider.”197 Courts have repeatedly held that this means that online
platforms are not liable for “user-generated content even if they

193. Id.
194. Letter from Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Cal. et al., to Members of the Cal. State Senate
(Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.eff.org/document/ab-730-berman-oppose-coalition-floor-alert82019.
195. Id.
196. Cal. Assemb. B. 730.
197. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2018).

(13) 54.4_TASHMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

11/18/21 12:45 PM

THE INTERNET’S BURGEONING POLITICAL CRISIS

1421

deliberately encouraged the posting of that content.”198 Accordingly,
these same platforms cannot be held liable under A.B. 730.
Although Section 230 is considered by many to be one of the
strongest forces protecting free speech online, its practical application
prevents online service providers—including social media
platforms—from being liable for what their users do, no matter how
criminal.199 This is particularly alarming in the context of deepfakes.
Because users routinely share genuine news information across social
media platforms, this makes it easier for false information to slip in
unnoticed, among other legitimate sites.200 Many consumers are not
savvy enough to tell the difference. Because manipulated media can
be shared across the globe instantaneously via social networking sites,
the sites inherently amplify them. The internet’s “amplification (and
platforms’ facilitation of it) is a key reason that deepfakes have drawn
public attention and one of the reasons they have the potential to erode
the integrity of elections.”201
Repealing Section 230 would not stop the spread of deepfakes,
and would instead create a slew of alarming free speech implications,
which are well beyond the scope of this Note. However, allowing
platforms to abdicate any responsibility for the spread of deepfakes,
and instead forcing litigants to track down individual entities, almost
certainly guarantees very few parties will ever be held accountable for
relevant harms.
VI. CONCLUSION
Technology is ever-changing—constantly racing itself to go
farther, do greater things, and achieve more. How society interacts
with technology is also continuously evolving, for both better and
worse. The technological advancements deepfakes offer are
remarkable. They have been widely used in the entertainment sphere,
and present numerous opportunities for those struggling with grief and
disability.202 But their ability to distort the truth, and to make that
198. Chesney & Citron, supra note 10, at 1796.
199. See Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, supra note 181.
200. Zoe Kleinman, What Is Fake News and How Can You Identify It?, BBC NEWS (Nov. 12,
2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/av/technology-46149888.
201. Nicholas Diakopoulos & Deborah G. Johnson, Anticipating and Addressing the Ethical
Implications of Deepfakes in the Context of Elections, 23 NEW MEDIA & SOCIETY (forthcoming
2021) (manuscript at 6), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3474183.
202. Chesney & Citron, supra note 10, at 1771.
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distortion seem factual, opens the door to a myriad of dystopian
possibilities.
A.B. 730 is California’s first attempt to address those
possibilities. Its strengths lie in its intent and definitions, but its
execution amounts to little more than a failure. The redundancies it
presents could be effectively addressed by incorporating manipulated
media into already-existing forms of law, such as defamation. Its
constitutional flaws present a greater challenge to enforcement, but
they could be overcome through revisions and narrowing. But the truly
critical failing of A.B. 730 lies in its implementation. A law that cannot
be enforced—even slightly—serves no purpose at all.
The time for proactive deepfakes legislation has already arrived,
and it is essential that states (and ideally, the federal government)
begin to address manipulated media. Our nation’s best aspects—the
press, the democratic process, fair elections—all rely on the public
maintaining a clear understanding of what is true, not what is “fake
news.” Strong legislation will be needed to achieve this, but A.B. 730
is not the template upon which to base future regulation.

